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From the Director 
 This report is one of a series that explores Georgia’s fiscal, economic and 
demographic features.  The demographic reports will consider many different sub-
populations.  The well being of the state depends on the well being of its residents, so 
it is important to understand the economic and social conditions of population.  The 
best way to do that is to consider each sub-population. 
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Executive Summary 
With Atlanta at its center, Georgia has experienced a recent influx of 
immigrants, from both other parts of the United States and other parts of the world.  
This report uses data from the most recent decennial censuses to analyze and assess 
the composition and experience of these immigrants to Georgia, with special attention 
paid to the Atlanta metropolitan area, where the majority of the immigrants have 
settled.  Atlanta is not very different from other large American cities in terms of its 
experience with immigration.  The influx of new immigrants is an important 
component of Atlanta’s and Georgia’s growth and population.  Migrants from other 
countries make up over ten percent of metropolitan Atlanta’s population, with almost 
four percent consisting of migrants who have come to the area from other countries 
within the five years preceding the census.   
 This report provides a detailed analysis of the origin of migrants to Georgia 
and Atlanta, and how those immigration flows changed over the course of the 1990s.  
It also assesses the extent to which these immigrants differ from the “native” 
population in terms of demographics, family structure and education.  Then it turns to 
an analysis of the economic success of the various immigrant groups in terms of 
income and other labor-market indicators such as employment and wage.  Finally, it 
characterizes and measures the assimilation experience of the various immigrant 
groups. 
The findings of this report can be summarized as follows. 
1) Migrants from other U.S. states make up the most important group of in-
migrants and make up the vast majority of non-native Georgians and 
Atlantans.  In Atlanta, in-migrants from outside of Georgia outnumber in-
migrants from other parts of Georgia by more than four-to-one and are 
more than twice the combined in-migration from other parts of Georgia 
and the rest of the world.   
 
2) Migration is vital to the Atlanta and Georgia economies.  For example, in 
2000, less than half of Atlanta’s residents were born anywhere in 
Georgia, and more than a third of Georgians were born outside Georgia. 
 
3) International immigration is becoming more important in Atlanta.  There 
was more international immigration to Atlanta in 2000 than migration 
from other parts of Georgia, although this was not the case in 1990. 
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4) The largest groups of migrants are Latin Americans, Asians and 
Europeans, in that order.  Latin American and Asian immigration into 
Atlanta is increasing the fastest.   
 
5) Across a number of dimensions, immigrants tend to differ from natives, 
although the extent of the difference depends on the area of origin.  
Educational attainment is probably the most important of these 
differences.  Immigrants from the developed world tend to be more 
educated, while immigrants from the developing world (especially Latin 
America and Africa) tend to be less educated. 
 
6) Labor market outcomes and incomes of recent immigrants vary by region 
of origin.  The economic success of these groups tends to reflect the 
educational attainment of the migrating group. 
 
7) Recent immigrants do worse than natives across all labor market 
outcomes, even when we control for individual characteristics through the 
use of regression analysis.  However, some of these differences appear to 
be eliminated through the process of assimilation. 
 
8) Controlling for individual characteristics, migrants from areas where 
recent migrants do the worst also appear to assimilate the least so that 
initial differences in economic success are persistent.  While assimilation 
is universal, disparities remain even after lengthy residence in the Atlanta 
region. 
 
While overall growth of the metropolitan region will likely slow somewhat, it 
will probably continue to be strong, and immigration from outside the United States 
(as well as from other U.S. states) will continue to be an important driver of local 
population and economic growth.  Like the past migrants analyzed here, future 
migrants will vary considerably in regards to education and economic success.  Well-
educated immigrants from the developed world and more vulnerable immigrants from 
the developing world are in some sense “different animals.”  Natives’ feelings about 
and response to these different groups of migrants will (and to some extent should) 
vary, as will the needs and effects on the local economy and public finance. 
Future immigrants will assimilate in a strong way, just as several generations 
of past immigrants have done in Atlanta and across the country.  Meanwhile, the bi-
cultural children of current immigrants will grow up even more assimilated.  The 
response of local populations to these changes will depend on political, cultural and 
economic views.  Those who are satisfied with the current immigration context will 
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likely want similar responses to immigration in the future.  Such satisfaction is quite 
reasonable, given the strong assimilation of past migrants, concurrent economic gains 
to the Atlanta and Georgia economies and relatively harmonious integration of ethnic 
communities into the metropolitan fabric.  Although disparities exist across migrant 
groups, there does not seem to be an immigration “problem” in Georgia or Atlanta. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the course of the past 30 years, the Atlanta region and Georgia have 
undergone massive changes.  Atlanta’s population has more than doubled, the urban 
footprint has grown tremendously, and the region has risen to a national and 
international prominence that is new in this part of the country.  Georgia’s population 
has doubled and income per capita has grown relative to the U.S.  To some extent, 
Atlanta’s growth has been an important factor in the growth and change in the state of 
Georgia.  Both Atlanta and the rest of Georgia are welcoming a large quantity of new 
residents.   
 In the Atlanta metropolitan area, the changes being wrought by the new 
Georgians are tangible and obvious.  In parts of the region, southern accents are the 
exception rather than the rule.  Suburban developments extend out from the city 
center into the country-side.  Public infrastructure is strained.  In many areas of the 
region, there is a proliferation of new languages and faiths in place of the more 
unified communities that had existed in the past.  Similar changes can be observed 
throughout Georgia. Whether one considers these changes good or bad, they are here 
to stay.   
 What is not as obvious is who these new residents are, how they are faring, 
and what their prospects are.  This report addresses these questions.  In Section II, we 
examine where the new residents are coming from and how that pattern has changed 
over the past decade.  We consider migrants from the rest of the United States as well 
as from other countries.  In Section III, we look at how the new Georgia residents that 
came from other countries are doing across an array of economic indicators.  Finally, 
in Section IV, we examine the likely future economic prospects of recent migrants by 
considering how the economic conditions of previous migrants to Atlanta and 
Georgia have improved over time.   
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II. Who Are the New Residents? 
This section takes a close look at Georgia’s in-migrants using two alternative 
concepts of migrants.  First, we can define migrants to Georgia (or to the Atlanta 
metropolitan area) as anyone who was not born here.  By this very inclusive 
definition over half of Georgia’s and Atlanta’s current population are in-migrants.  
(Note that a migrant is not necessarily someone from another country.)  Second, we 
can define a migrant more narrowly as someone who lived elsewhere five years 
earlier.  We consider both concepts of migrants, but focus most on the second concept 
of migrants. 
The analysis in this report is based on data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. 
Census.  We use the Public Use Microdata Sample, which contains the Census 
information for a 5 percent sample of individual households.  One of the questions 
the Census asks is, Where did you live 5 years ago?  Thus, for those over 5 years of 
age we know who moved into Georgia and into Atlanta within the last five years. We 
define “recent migrant” as someone who moved into Georgia or Atlanta between 
1995 and 2000, and we define those who were not born in Atlanta or in Georgia but 
were here in 1995 and 2000 as “long-term migrants.”   
 
A. Where Are the New Residents From? 
Table 1 presents the percentages of current (as of 1990 or as of 2000) Georgia 
and Atlanta residents by the nature of their residency five years before the decennial 
census, for the two most recent censuses.  In 2000, a plurality of Georgians lived in 
the same housing unit in which they did in 1995.  Mobility is somewhat higher for 
Atlanta residents; a larger percentage of Atlanta residents than Georgia residents 
lived in a different house five years before the census.  (Note that migrants to Georgia 
include migrants to Atlanta.)  This reflects the higher in-migration to the Atlanta 
metropolitan area, and perhaps the greater turnover of housing in metro Atlanta.  This 
pattern is consistent across the two census years.   
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TABLE 1.  RESIDENCE FIVE YEARS PRIOR, BROAD CATEGORIES 
 --------1990-------- ----------2000--------- 
 GA Atlanta GA Atlanta 
Less than Five years old 7.7% 7.8% 7.3% 7.6% 
Living in same house 47.4% 41.4% 47.2% 42.2% 
Not living in same house 44.8% 50.7% 45.5% 50.2% 
 
TABLE 2.  AREA OF RESIDENCE FIVE YEARS PRIOR TO CENSUS 
 
 
Residence Five Years Prior to Census  Year 
-------------Residence In Census Year------------- 
------------1990---------- -----------2000----------- 
GA Atlanta GA Atlanta 
 
Atlanta 24.42% 70.72% 32.81% 71.96% 
Other Georgia 55.15 3.22 46.13 2.79 
Other U.S. states 11.39 16.47 11.08 13.84 
Elsewhere North America -- -- 0.08 0.13 
Europe -- -- 0.52 0.58 
Latin America -- -- 1.24 1.82 
Middle East -- -- 0.07 0.12 
Africa -- -- 0.18 0.37 
Asia -- -- 0.45 0.67 
Oceania -- -- 0.09 0.12 
All Foreign 1.23 1.69 2.65 3.81 
Note: Numbers do not sum to 100 because the “less than five years old” category is not reported. 
 
Table 2 presents information on where the Georgia and Atlanta residents 
lived five years earlier.  For 1990, for foreign migrants, the Census does not report 
the country from which recent international migrants came, only whether they 
migrated from a foreign country.  Thus, the ability to make comparisons between the 
two census years is limited.  However, some important patterns emerge from this 
table.  First, most of the current residents of Georgia at the time of the census lived in 
Georgia five years earlier.  In 2000, 78.9 percent of Georgians lived in Georgia in 
1995.  For Atlanta, 72.0 percent of its residents in 2000 lived in Atlanta in 1995. 
Second, the vast majority of new Georgians and new Atlantans come from other parts 
of the United States.  In 1990, migrants to Georgia and to Atlanta from other states 
were almost ten times more common than international migrants.  Migrants to Atlanta 
from other parts of Georgia were nearly two times more common than international 
migrants.  Third, for 2000, Latin America accounted for the largest percentage of 
international migrants to Georgia and Atlanta.  For Georgia, Europe accounted for the 
Georgia’s Immigrants:  Past, Present, and Future 
 
 
4 
second most international migrants, while for Atlanta, Asia accounted for the second 
largest percentage of international migrants.1 
 Another interesting pattern that can be seen from Table 2 is the changing 
composition of new Atlantans and Georgians.  First, in 2000, intra-state migrants to 
Atlanta were less important than international migrants, a change from 1990.  
Second, interstate migrants also became less important; the percentage of Atlantans 
who lived elsewhere in the United States five years earlier dropped between 1990 and 
2000.  However, in absolute terms, the number of interstate migrants to Atlanta 
increased by nearly 17 percent over this period.   
 A final important pattern emerges from the last row of Table 2, namely, 
international migrants to Atlanta and Georgia increased as a percentage of the 
population.  Recent migrants from abroad made up less than two percent of Atlanta’s 
and Georgia’s population in 1990, but both percentages more than doubled by 2000.  
In absolute numbers, the increase is even starker.  The population of recent 
international migrants living in Atlanta increased from about 50,000 to about 157,000 
in these ten years, a 214 percent increase.   
 How does Atlanta’s population of recent international migrants compare to 
that for other large metropolitan areas?  Table 3 reports for 2000 the percent of recent 
international migrants by geographic areas for the U.S. and several major 
metropolitan areas.  The average of the population that resided in a foreign country 
five years before the 2000 census for these 22 metropolitan areas is about 3.65 
percent.  Thus, Atlanta is about average as compared to these metropolitan areas but 
above the U.S. average of 2.80 percent for all metropolitan areas. 
 Atlanta’s composition of recent migrants’ country of origin is not particularly 
different than other major metropolitan areas for the major groups of migrants 
(Europeans, Latin Americans and Asians), but the percentage from Sub-Saharan 
Africa is roughly twice the average for the major metropolitan areas listed in Table 2.  
From the less important countries of origin, Middle East and Oceania, Atlanta stands 
out in having fewer migrants.   
                                                          
1 Migrants from Middle Eastern nations form a separate group.  Therefore, the totals for Asia and 
Africa exclude migrants from the Middle East throughout this report. 
 
TABLE 3.  INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRANTS IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES, 2000 
 
Percent of Current Population,  
---------------------------------By Country of Residence in 1995--------------------------------
MSA/ 
PMSA 
All 
Foreign 
 
Europe 
Latin 
America 
North 
America 
Mid-
East 
 
Africa 
 
Asia 
 
Oceania 
US 2.41 0.45 1.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.49 0.12 
US Metro 2.80 0.51 1.23 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.58 0.14 
US Rural 0.98 0.21 0.47 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.04 
New York 6.02 1.24 2.41 0.12 0.32 0.23 1.35 0.34 
Los Angeles 4.85 0.38 2.65 0.09 0.28 0.08 1.30 0.06 
Chicago 3.60 0.90 1.62 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.63 0.10 
Washington 5.08 1.04 1.57 0.15 0.35 0.65 1.19 0.13 
Baltimore 1.84 0.57 0.33 0.06 0.10 0.20 0.48 0.10 
San Francisco 5.41 1.04 1.61 0.18 0.17 0.07 2.19 0.14 
Philadelphia 1.90 0.46 0.39 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.50 0.21 
Boston 3.92 0.97 1.24 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.86 0.22 
Detroit 1.96 0.61 0.32 0.15 0.27 0.13 0.43 0.06 
Dallas 4.77 0.36 3.25 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.62 0.05 
Houston 4.64 0.44 2.91 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.70 0.08 
Atlanta 3.81 0.58 1.82 0.13 0.12 0.37 0.67 0.12 
Miami 9.06 0.49 7.66 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.49 
Seattle 3.62 0.92 0.63 0.31 0.16 0.22 1.26 0.10 
Phoenix 4.22 0.50 2.89 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.40 0.05 
Minneapolis 2.00 0.39 0.54 0.08 0.06 0.41 0.48 0.04 
Cleveland 1.26 0.49 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.18 
San Diego 3.72 0.49 1.67 0.11 0.13 0.09 1.07 0.16 
St. Louis 1.31 0.49 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.30 0.07 
Denver 3.77 0.60 2.22 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.49 0.08 
Tampa 2.80 0.69 1.01 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.31 0.41 
Pittsburgh 0.76 0.25 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.04 
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In addition to considering residence five years prior to the 1990 and 2000 
censuses, we can also consider the place of birth of current residents, which gives us 
a sense of the cumulative migration.  Table 4 reports the percentage of the Georgia 
and Atlanta population by place of birth, for both 1990 and 2000. 
 
TABLE 4.  PERCENT OF CURRENT POPULATION BY PLACE OF BIRTH 
 -----------1990----------- ------------2000----------- 
Place of Birth GA Atlanta GA Atlanta 
GA 66.94 52.76 60.38 48.97 
US 29.87 41.83 32.43 40.09 
Elsewhere in North America 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.29 
Latin America 0.65 1.16 3.31 4.91 
Europe 1.01 1.37 1.28 1.63 
Middle East 0.12 0.28 0.25 0.46 
Africa 0.12 0.33 0.42 0.87 
Asia 0.82 1.56 1.46 2.45 
Oceania 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.35 
Other 0.16 0.23 -- -- 
All Foreign Born 3.19 5.42 7.18 10.95 
 
 
 For both 1990 and 2000, only around half of Atlantans were born in Georgia 
and even fewer were born in Atlanta.2  Nearly 40 percent of Georgians in 2000 were 
born elsewhere.  We also see from Table 4 that the percentage of foreign born 
residents more than doubled between 1990 and 2000 for both Atlanta and Georgia 
(consistent with the increase in recent international immigrants documented in Table 
2).  Atlanta is the primary location of these international migrants (as opposed to 
other parts of the state).   This increase in the concentration of foreign born in Atlanta 
(and Georgia generally) is replicated for every foreign region subgroup, although the 
increase in percentages of foreign North Americans (primarily Canadians) and 
Europeans was not very significant.  The percentage of foreign born migrants in 
Georgia and Atlanta from Asia nearly doubled and the percentage from Latin 
American   more   than   quadrupled   between    1990   and   2000.     This  increasing 
                                                          
2 We are unable to know whether someone was born in Atlanta or in Georgia outside of Atlanta.  
However, Table 2 tells us that at least some people are moving from the rest of Georgia to Atlanta, 
so it seems natural to expect that some of these people born in Georgia and living in Atlanta were 
born outside of Atlanta. 
 
TABLE 5.  INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRANTS IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES, 1990 
  
Percent of Current Population  
---------------------------------------------By Place of Birth-------------------------------------------- 
 
MSA/ 
PMSA 
Recent 
Foreign 
Immigrant 
Any 
Foreign 
Birth 
 
 
Europe 
 
Latin 
America 
 
North 
America 
 
Mid-
East 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Oceania 
 
 
Other 
US 1.89 8.59 1.98 3.26 0.35 0.28 0.10 1.78 0.52 0.32 
US Metro 2.22 10.21 2.30 3.89 0.38 0.35 0.12 2.16 0.64 0.38 
US Rural 0.64 2.48 0.73 0.88 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.38 0.08 0.09 
New York 5.80 32.20 7.42 11.81 0.26 1.07 0.30 4.79 4.89 1.67 
Los Angeles 7.13 33.81 2.81 19.44 0.54 1.45 0.17 7.57 0.41 1.42 
Chicago 2.48 14.26 4.65 4.83 0.22 0.54 0.10 2.54 0.96 0.42 
Washington 4.68 13.83 2.77 4.06 0.28 1.12 0.72 4.02 0.39 0.46 
Baltimore 1.37 4.67 1.95 0.65 0.14 0.23 0.11 1.28 0.21 0.10 
San Francisco 6.08 28.83 4.67 6.98 0.62 0.89 0.16 13.69 0.71 1.11 
Philadelphia 1.22 6.53 2.65 0.67 0.19 0.19 0.09 1.45 1.11 0.19 
Boston 3.26 13.70 4.71 2.88 1.09 0.54 0.42 2.56 0.96 0.54 
Detroit 0.84 6.11 2.70 0.32 1.06 0.61 0.05 1.12 0.11 0.14 
Dallas 2.04 9.51 1.08 5.20 0.23 0.33 0.26 1.88 0.17 0.35 
Houston 2.60 13.84 1.24 8.22 0.20 0.48 0.25 2.68 0.25 0.51 
Atlanta 1.69 5.42 1.37 1.16 0.27 0.28 0.33 1.56 0.22 0.23 
Miami 8.76 49.08 2.73 40.46 0.35 0.41 0.11 0.70 2.24 2.09 
Seattle 2.17 9.40 2.50 0.58 1.29 0.27 0.12 4.14 0.27 0.22 
Phoenix 2.03 8.19 1.86 3.86 0.56 0.20 0.07 1.14 0.20 0.31 
Minneapolis 1.09 4.30 1.21 0.36 0.37 0.18 0.14 1.88 0.07 0.09 
Cleveland 0.72 5.90 3.53 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.06 0.82 0.56 0.10 
San Diego 4.59 18.78 2.38 8.48 0.71 0.61 0.17 5.21 0.55 0.66 
St. Louis 0.76 2.45 1.17 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.06 
Denver 1.44 6.01 1.90 1.51 0.36 0.25 0.11 1.52 0.17 0.21 
Tampa 1.69 8.84 3.09 2.38 0.89 0.18 0.06 0.94 1.01 0.28 
Pittsburgh 0.47 2.80 1.78 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.54 0.04 0.05 
 
 
  
 
 
TABLE 6.  PLACE OF BIRTH IN MAJOR AMERICAN CITIES, 2000 
 ------------------------------------------------Percent of Current Population by Place of Birth----------------------------------------------- 
MSA/PMSA 
Same 
State 
Other 
State 
Foreign 
Born 
North 
America 
Latin 
America 
 
Europe 
 
Mid-East 
 
Africa 
 
Asia 
 
Oceania 
US 61.06 27.48 11.46 0.33 5.49 1.96 0.47 0.22 2.41 0.58 
US Metro 58.20 28.21 13.59 0.36 6.48 2.28 0.58 0.27 2.92 0.70 
US Rural 71.75 24.72 3.53 0.24 1.80 0.75 0.06 0.04 0.51 0.13 
New York 51.90 10.39 37.70 0.26 17.41 7.36 1.76 0.73 6.60 3.60 
Los Angeles 45.03 17.91 37.06 0.40 22.78 2.15 2.50 0.27 8.61 0.35 
Chicago 63.36 18.68 17.95 0.21 8.29 4.65 0.69 0.23 3.15 0.73 
Washington 30.10 51.28 18.63 0.31 6.77 2.83 1.51 1.62 5.15 0.44 
Baltimore 63.06 30.29 6.65 0.16 1.26 2.09 0.42 0.43 2.01 0.28 
San Francisco 42.10 25.00 32.90 0.66 9.21 4.86 1.12 0.24 15.94 0.88 
Philadelphia 66.32 25.25 8.43 0.21 1.44 2.47 0.35 0.32 2.35 1.30 
Boston 63.28 20.46 16.26 0.76 4.87 4.59 0.77 0.69 3.58 1.00 
Detroit 72.61 19.41 7.99 0.80 0.92 2.66 1.61 0.18 1.62 0.21 
Dallas 55.46 27.55 16.99 0.27 11.48 1.16 0.59 0.48 2.83 0.18 
Houston 56.64 22.97 20.39 0.25 13.93 1.18 0.75 0.50 3.49 0.28 
Atlanta 48.97 40.09 10.95 0.29 4.91 1.63 0.46 0.87 2.45 0.35 
Miami 29.61 16.50 53.89 0.27 47.57 2.14 0.48 0.14 0.91 2.37 
Seattle 45.30 39.68 15.03 1.20 2.25 3.31 0.60 0.57 6.72 0.38 
Phoenix 32.36 52.02 15.62 0.57 10.66 1.99 0.38 0.16 1.62 0.23 
Minneapolis 67.93 25.08 6.99 0.31 1.58 1.25 0.26 0.80 2.66 0.13 
Cleveland 73.33 20.50 6.17 0.25 0.61 2.91 0.39 0.12 1.04 0.84 
San Diego 43.64 33.30 23.06 0.58 11.72 2.35 0.98 0.32 6.60 0.52 
St. Louis 70.36 26.14 3.50 0.13 0.55 1.31 0.20 0.11 1.09 0.11 
Denver 41.33 46.09 12.58 0.40 6.83 2.28 0.37 0.30 2.22 0.19 
Tampa 31.41 56.41 12.18 0.85 4.51 3.12 0.35 0.17 1.56 1.62 
Pittsburgh 84.21 12.93 2.86 0.14 0.27 1.33 0.15 0.07 0.78 0.12 
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internationalization of Atlanta is both a cause and effect of the city’s rise in 
prominence, nationally and internationally.3 
 Tables 5 and 6 compare the place of birth of current residents of Atlanta with 
that for other major metropolitan areas for 1990 and 2000, respectively.  In contrast to 
the figures for recent migrants, Atlanta is below average in the presence of foreign 
born individuals in both 1990 and 2000.  This reflects the more recent influx of 
individuals from foreign countries experienced by Atlanta.  Not only does Atlanta 
have a lower percentage of foreign born individuals (about 5.4 percent in 1990 and 
10.9 percent in 2000) than the major metropolitan areas such as New York, Chicago, 
and Boston, but Atlanta has a smaller percentage of foreign born residents than 
metropolitan areas in general.   
This pattern suggests that as Atlanta has grown, its international profile has 
grown with it, thus attracting increasing numbers and shares of foreign migrants.  We 
should expect that Georgia and Atlanta will continue to increase the numbers and 
percentage of its foreign born population as its international reputation grows with its 
population.   
 
B. What Are the Characteristics of Recent Migrants?  
In the previous sub-section, we examined the place of origin, either by 
residence five years earlier or by place of birth, of Atlanta’s and Georgia’s migrant 
population.  We now turn to consideration of the demographic characteristics and 
educational attainment of migrants 25 years of age and over.  Table 7 reports the 
average household size, number of children, age, gender, race, marital status, and 
educational attainment for current (2000) Georgia and Atlanta residents, by place of 
residence  in  1995.   The  top two panels present the data for Georgia while the lower  
                                                          
3 A strong pattern exists that is not apparent from either of these tables.  The intensity of 
international immigration to a city is highly correlated with the general growth of the city.  In 
Table 3, this can be seen by comparing the recent immigrant percentage in slow-growth cities like 
Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Detroit, Philadelphia, Cleveland and Baltimore with the percentages in fast 
growing areas like Atlanta, New York, Chicago, or any of the California or Southern Cities 
(except Tampa).  The same pattern is apparent in 1990, although fast growth Atlanta is no longer 
in the high immigration category.  This could be because growing cities take some time to become 
known to potential immigrants, so that early growth is fueled by internal migration, which raises 
the city’s profile internationally enough for it to show up on international migrants’ “radars.”  
Thus, we would expect the immigration numbers for Tampa to increase dramatically in 2010.   
 
 
TABLE 7.  CHARACTERISTICS OF RECENT MIGRANTS AGED 25+: 2000 
    
All 
Obs 
-----------------------------------------------------------Residence in 1995------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
Variable 
 
Atlanta 
Other 
GA 
Other 
U.S. 
Other 
N.Am. 
Latin 
Amer. 
 
Europe 
Mid-
East 
 
Africa 
 
Asia 
 
Oceania 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 
D
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
s
 Family size 2.91 2.94 2.80 3.03 2.90 5.07 3.15 3.49 3.35 3.50 3.38 
no. Children 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.93 0.98 1.24 1.06 1.11 0.94 1.00 1.15 
 % black 25.80 25.92 26.58 23.01 19.56 8.41 24.77 8.33 83.29 12.65 30.10 
age 48.15 47.54 50.44 41.64 39.72 36.12 39.16 40.61 38.26 38.58 42.35 
%Female 52.89 53.00 53.87 50.02 48.44 36.51 47.09 48.89 47.33 46.99 48.98 
%Married 62.84 63.41 62.41 62.11 69.78 64.61 67.51 75.56 54.99 73.72 62.24 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
%Drop Out 23.22 17.30 29.28 12.88 8.89 59.87 13.99 14.44 19.72 17.26 16.84 
%H.S. Grad. 29.74 26.73 34.35 20.59 21.78 17.85 21.71 18.33 29.70 15.40 18.37 
%Some Coll. 24.60 27.05 21.65 30.85 24.44 11.23 32.95 21.11 23.67 22.92 31.12 
%Bachelors 14.52 19.19 9.20 23.41 30.22 6.58 16.13 33.89 18.10 25.22 23.47 
%Masters 5.33 6.59 3.66 8.50 9.33 1.79 10.17 7.22 6.03 14.51 7.14 
%Doc/Prof 2.58 3.13 1.86 3.77 5.33 2.68 5.05 5.00 2.78 4.69 3.06 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
t
l
a
n
t
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 
D
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
s
 Family Size 3.00 2.96 2.86 3.03 3.03 5.16 3.21 3.70 3.39 3.69 3.53 
no. Children 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.90 1.03 1.20 1.00 1.18 0.94 0.98 1.23 
%black 26.29 26.58 24.45 26.80 16.23 7.53 16.33 4.10 89.04 7.89 38.66 
age 46.14 47.69 41.07 40.34 38.95 35.78 38.26 41.53 37.47 38.91 40.03 
%Female 52.49 53.30 50.54 50.38 48.70 36.28 47.41 51.64 49.32 47.06 52.94 
%Married 62.51 63.21 55.88 58.87 72.73 65.17 64.52 79.51 52.60 75.80 55.46 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
%Drop Out 16.67 17.22 15.87 10.00 5.84 57.43 11.93 17.21 19.73 18.98 10.08 
%H.S. Grad. 25.02 26.70 22.39 17.19 14.94 19.56 22.14 16.39 29.59 14.44 17.65 
%Some Coll. 27.05 27.02 27.52 29.51 27.27 10.57 22.92 17.21 23.01 16.31 31.93 
%Bachelors 20.68 19.23 23.33 28.92 37.01 7.39 21.82 36.07 19.73 28.34 28.57 
%Masters 7.26 6.66 7.25 10.37 9.09 2.21 14.13 9.02 5.48 17.11 9.24 
%Doc/Prof 3.32 3.15 3.63 4.01 5.84 2.83 7.06 4.10 2.47 4.81 2.52 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8.  COMPARISON OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN ATLANTA, 2000 
   --------------------Residence in 1995 (percentage difference from average of all Atlanta residence)------------------- 
Variable 
 
All 
Obs. 
 
 
Atlanta 
 
Other 
GA 
 
Other 
U.S. 
Other 
North 
America 
 
Latin 
America 
 
 
Europe 
 
Mid-
East 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Oceania 
Demographics            
 Family size 3.00 -1.57 -4.72 0.97 0.99 71.87 7.02 23.11 12.86 22.79 17.54 
 no. Children 0.83 -2.73 -4.51 9.13 24.74 44.70 20.44 42.61 13.21 17.91 48.23 
 %black 26.29 1.08 -7.01 1.94 -38.26 -71.35 -37.91 -84.41 238.63 -70.00 47.01 
 age 46.14 3.35 -11.00 -12.57 -15.58 -22.46 -17.08 -9.99 -18.80 -15.68 -13.24 
 %Female 52.49 1.54 -3.71 -4.02 -7.22 -30.88 -9.68 -1.62 -6.05 -10.34 0.86 
 %Married 62.51 1.12 -10.61 -5.82 16.35 4.26 3.22 27.20 -15.85 21.27 -11.27 
Education            
 %Drop Out 16.67 3.32 -4.80 -40.01 -64.94 244.49 -28.43 3.25 18.33 13.88 -39.51 
 %H.S. Grad 25.02 6.75 -10.49 -31.27 -40.30 -21.82 -11.52 -34.47 18.27 -42.29 -29.46 
 %Some Coll. 27.05 -0.11 1.75 9.10 0.83 -60.91 -15.26 -36.36 -14.91 -39.70 18.06 
 %Bachelors 20.68 -7.01 12.82 39.84 78.95 -64.25 5.50 74.37 -4.63 37.03 38.14 
 %Masters 7.26 -8.23 -0.11 42.72 25.17 -69.55 94.53 24.14 -24.56 135.61 27.27 
 %Doc/Prof 3.32 -4.95 9.30 20.73 76.09 -14.63 112.85 23.48 -25.71 45.01 -24.04 
 
 
  
Georgia’s Immigrants:  Past, Present, and Future 
 
 
12 
two panels present the data for Atlanta.  Table 8 reports, for Atlanta only, the values 
from Table 7, but reports the subgroup values as percentage differences from the 
average of current Atlanta residents.  Thus, Table 8 highlights differences across the 
various immigrant populations.  The patterns are similar for Georgia as a whole and 
Atlanta, so we focus on Georgia, and say little about Table 8. 
Considering the top two rows of Table 7, we see that current Georgia 
residents tend to live in smaller households and have fewer children than migrants to 
Georgia.  In the case of Latin Americans and immigrants from developing regions, 
these differences are quite large.  Recent migrants to Georgia are also younger and 
are slightly less likely to be female than all current residents.  Migrants from Latin 
America, the Middle East, and Asia are less likely to be black than migrants from 
other areas and longer-term residents of Georgia.  Not surprisingly, migrants from 
Africa are more likely to be black.  Finally, in terms of marital status, migrants from 
the Middle East and Asia were more likely to be married and migrants from Africa 
were less likely to be married than other subgroups.   
 Perhaps the most important characteristic is education, since, on average, 
highly educated individuals fare better in the labor market, put less strain on social 
service agencies, have better health outcomes, more successful children, and 
presumably contribute more to the local economy (Moretti 2004a).  Higher educated 
people might also be expected to have an easier time assimilating into the local 
economy.  There is also a substantial literature in urban economics linking high 
education levels to better metropolitan economic performance, individual 
productivity effects, and knowledge spillovers.4  Thus, the educational attainment of 
these recent migrants to Atlanta is of special interest.   
Table 7 presents education levels for individuals over the age of 24 years of 
age.  Table 7 shows that “native” Georgians, i.e., those who lived in Georgia in 1995, 
were less educated on average than current (2000) Georgia residents.  On average 
recent migrants to Georgia were less likely to be high school drop-outs and more 
likely to be college educated.  However, there are differences across the subgroups.  
                                                          
4 See for example Rauch (1993), Glaeser et al (1995), Moretti (2004a), and Moretti (2004b).  
Moretti (2004a) provides a good review of the many benefits of having an educated populace. 
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In particular, Latin American immigrants were much more likely to have less than a 
high-school degree.    
The distribution of education among immigrants from the Middle East and 
Asia is bi-modal, i.e., there is a large percentage that are highly educated and a large 
percentage who are poorly educated, while the proportion with middle education 
levels (high-school graduates and those attending some college but not graduating) is 
small.  This could reflect differences in education level between countries within 
regions (where-by migrants from one country in the region are highly educated while 
migrants from another are poorly educated), or reflect different groups within 
countries (where-by migrants from a country are comprised of many doctors and 
lawyers with high education and many displaced agricultural workers).   
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III. How Are Migrants Doing Economically? 
 We now turn to the question of how immigrants to Georgia and Atlanta are 
faring in terms of income and labor market outcomes.  One limitation in considering 
economic outcomes is that the censuses used in this report were conducted near the 
peak of a business cycle.  The 1990 census was conducted just before the peak of the 
long Reagan-era expansion, while the 2000 census was conducted only a year before 
the peak of the even longer Clinton/Greenspan expansion.  It has been noted by some 
researchers that vulnerable populations (blacks, less educated people) are much more 
sensitive to cyclical changes in economic activity than more well-to-do populations 
(Gilroy (1974), Hoynes (1999), Bradbury (2000)).  It is likely that immigrants’ labor 
market outcomes are also more cyclical than those of more long-standing residents 
(Defreitas 1986).  Thus, the differences between natives and immigrants reported 
below must be interpreted cautiously as probably best-case scenarios and may not 
represent what was going on during the short Bush I recession or even after several 
years of relatively weak job growth nationally that has occurred since the more recent 
Bush II recession.   
 
A. Income  
 With those provisos in mind, we can turn to the data.  Table 9 reports 2000 
average household income, including transfers, and household income as a percent of 
the federal poverty level for current Georgia and Atlanta residents by place of 
residence in 1995.  Note that the poverty level depends on household size and the 
ages of the householders.  Recent immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa have the 
lowest household income, but Latin American immigrants have the lowest household 
income as a percent of their poverty level.  This is because Latin American 
immigrants tend to live in much larger households (Table 7); the average household 
size for recent immigrants from Latin America is 5.07, while it is 3.49 for recent 
African immigrants.  The income required to keep five people out of poverty is 
greater than that required to keep three people out of poverty.   
 Tables 10 and 11 report each sub-group’s average income as a proportion of 
the  average  income  of  all  residents.   The  last  row  shows that recent international 
Georgia’s Immigrants:  Past, Present, and Future 
 
 
 15
TABLE 9.  AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME AS A PERCENT 
OF THE POVERTY LEVEL, BY RESIDENCE IN 1995, 2000 
  -----------Georgia----------- ------------Atlanta----------- 
  HH Inc Poverty HH Inc Poverty 
 All Obs. $58,676 293% $72,379 333% 
--
--
--
-R
es
id
en
ce
 in
 1
99
5-
--
--
--
- Atlanta $72,479 338% $73,681 343% 
Other GA $48,760 271% $58,018 288% 
Other U.S. $63,413 299% $75,039 339% 
Elsewhere in North Amer. $70,435 326% $81,721 373% 
Latin Am $51,054 177% $56,464 190% 
Europe $56,575 269% $70,386 294% 
Mid-East $52,744 256% $54,956 254% 
Africa $46,370 221% $45,270 221% 
Asia $54,713 252% $60,830 271% 
Oceania $46,878 240% $57,553 285% 
Any Foreign $52,954 220% $59,137 235% 
 
TABLE 10.  AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND INCOME AS A PERCENT OF POVERTY 
LEVEL, BY RESIDENCE IN 1995, AS PROPORTION OF AREA AVERAGE, 2000 
   -----------Georgia---------- -------------Atlanta----------- 
   HH Inc Poverty HH Inc Poverty 
  All Obs. $58,676 293% $72,379 333% 
--
--
--
-R
es
id
en
ce
 in
 1
99
5-
--
--
--
 Atlanta 1.24 1.15 1.02 1.03 
Other GA 0.83 0.92 0.80 0.87 
Other U.S. 1.08 1.02 1.04 1.02 
Elsewhere in North Amer. 1.20 1.11 1.13 1.12 
Latin Am 0.87 0.60 0.78 0.57 
Europe 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.89 
Mid-East 0.90 0.88 0.76 0.76 
Africa 0.79 0.75 0.63 0.67 
Asia 0.93 0.86 0.84 0.81 
Oceania 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.86 
Any Foreign 0.90 0.75 0.82 0.71 
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TABLE 11.  AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND INCOME AS A PERCENT OF POVERTY 
LEVEL, BY RESIDENCE IN 1985, AS PROPORTION OF AREA AVERAGE, 1990 
   ----------------Georgia--------------- ---------------Atlanta--------------- 
   HH Inc Poverty HH Inc Poverty 
  R
es
id
en
ce
 
19
85
 
All Obs. $37,655 279% $49,366 336% 
Atlanta 1.31 1.21 1.02 1.02 
Other GA 0.87 0.93 0.87 0.90 
Other U.S. 1.07 1.03 1.00 1.01 
Abroad 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.79 
 
immigrants to Georgia have household incomes that are about 90 percent of the 
average household income in Georgia, and have income as a percent of the poverty 
level that is about 25 percent less than the Georgia average in 2000 and about 14 
percent lower in 1990.  For the Atlanta metropolitan area, incomes of recent 
international migrant households are 82 percent of the Atlanta area average, and 
incomes as a percent of poverty level are about 29 percent lower than the Atlanta 
average in 2000 and 21 percent lower in 1990.  The fact that immigrants compare 
worse relative to Atlantans than to Georgians is due to the higher incomes in Atlanta.  
However, immigrants to Atlanta have higher incomes than immigrants to Georgia, on 
average. 
Both Atlanta and Georgia international migrants do considerably better than 
non-Atlantan Georgians in terms of household income, but not in terms of poverty.  
Other Georgians (i.e., non Atlantans) had average income in 2000 that was 83 percent 
of the average income of all Georgians, while that percentage for international 
migrants was 90 percent.  This result is due to the larger average household sizes for 
most international migrant families.  For both years, long-term residents of Atlanta 
and migrants from other American states were the highest paid groups.  For 2000, 
international migrants from North America and Europe had the highest average 
household income and highest income as a percentage of the poverty level.  
Immigrants from Asia and Oceania rank next highest in both these income categories, 
while immigrants from Latin America, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa 
ranked lowest in both categories. 
Comparisons of 1990 and 2000 suggest two possible dynamics at work: a 
brain-drain story vis-à-vis the rest of Georgia (wherein Atlanta has tapped-out the 
talent pool in Georgia and is turning to international immigrants), or more selectivity 
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of migrants from other countries.  Household income of international migrant relative 
to the average income of all Georgia residents was virtually unchanged between 1990 
and 2000 (Tables 10 and 11); the ratio went from 0.91 in 1990 to 0.90 in 2000.  
Incomes of non-Atlantan Georgians relative to Georgia or Atlanta average income 
declined; for example, for Georgia the ratio declined from 0.87 in 1990 to 0.83 in 
2000.  This suggests that both for Georgia and Atlanta, non-Atlantan Georgians 
became relatively less productive workers as compared to the Georgia or Atlanta 
workers as a whole, if one takes household income as a proxy for labor ability, as 
many labor economists do (Griliches 1977).   
For long-term Georgians, there is a similar trend in income as a percent of the 
poverty level.  This means that the change in relative income for non-Atlantan 
Georgians was not due to changes in household size.  On the other hand, the trend in 
the relative income as a percent of the poverty level for recent immigrants shows that 
international migrant households are becoming relatively poorer on average.  
Average household income of recent international migrants (relative to the state and 
metro averages) has remained steady.  However, household income as a percentage of 
the poverty level of international migrants relative to the state or metropolitan 
averages decreased because household size of international migrants increased.  
There are two explanations of this pattern.  First, it is possible that recent immigrants 
to Georgia and Atlanta are more likely today to have family in tow.  Second, it is 
possible that immigrant households have larger families than previously.  
 
B. Employment  
Income is only one measure of economic success, employment is another.  
Table 12 presents, in the first column, the averages for Georgia and Atlanta of four 
employment-related variables: the proportion of the working-age population that are 
working, the average number of weeks worked, the average wage, and the proportion 
of the population with a good job.5  All of the averages are conditioned on the 
individual being of working age (18-65).   
                                                          
5 “Good” jobs are defined as those that the Census Bureau classifies as managerial or professional 
specialty occupations.  These jobs usually require at least a four year college degree.    
 
 
 
 
TABLE 12.  LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES FOR VARIOUS GROUPS (AGED 18-65), 2000 
    ------------------------------Residence in 1995 (value as proportion to unconditional average)---------------------------- 
  
 
 
 
All Obs. 
 
 
Atlanta 
 
Other 
GA 
 
Other 
U.S. 
Other 
North 
America 
 
Latin 
America 
 
 
Europe 
 
Mid-
East 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Oceania 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 
A
l
l
 
S
e
x
 
Work 0.806 1.036 0.965 1.050 0.919 0.878 0.966 0.827 0.907 0.874 0.971 
Weeks  36.76 1.050 0.967 1.025 0.894 0.782 0.946 0.781 0.812 0.809 0.922 
Wage 18.39 1.173 0.870 1.001 1.742 0.587 1.003 0.902 0.908 0.994 0.860 
"Good" job 0.265 1.180 0.802 1.297 1.651 0.228 1.137 1.099 0.565 1.220 0.905 
             
M
a
l
e
 
Work 0.861 1.034 0.962 1.054 1.011 0.934 1.002 0.941 0.947 0.979 0.974 
Weeks  40.47 1.043 0.964 1.042 1.012 0.832 1.000 0.911 0.862 0.914 0.928 
Wage 20.54 1.172 0.881 0.993 1.374 0.536 1.008 0.828 0.846 1.052 0.855 
"Good" job 0.248 1.222 0.741 1.383 2.241 0.212 1.250 1.379 0.660 1.597 0.845 
              
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
t
l
a
n
t
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 
A
l
l
 
S
e
x
 
Work 0.840 0.999 1.004 1.039 0.897 0.859 0.928 0.721 0.887 0.831 0.976 
Weeks  38.64 1.010 0.964 1.020 0.873 0.755 0.884 0.672 0.789 0.745 0.923 
Wage 21.33 1.022 0.886 0.973 1.791 0.537 1.084 0.825 0.801 0.975 0.815 
"Good" job 0.325 0.972 1.058 1.240 1.500 0.183 1.070 0.866 0.446 1.051 0.853 
             
M
a
l
e
 
Work 0.899 0.998 0.975 1.036 1.004 0.921 0.953 0.846 0.929 0.957 0.973 
Weeks  42.47 1.008 0.928 1.028 1.003 0.813 0.928 0.822 0.843 0.860 0.941 
Wage 23.58 1.030 0.770 0.993 1.292 0.502 1.098 0.719 0.735 1.075 0.871 
"Good" job 0.320 0.962 1.004 1.297 2.019 0.176 1.163 1.100 0.488 1.364 0.911 
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As might be expected, and as is seen in the first column of Table 12, the 
employment rate, weeks worked, and wage rate are higher in Atlanta than in Georgia 
as a whole, and are higher for males.  Good jobs are more common in Atlanta, but 
about equally likely for males and females.  
The rest of Table 12 shows the sub-group averages as a proportion of the 
Georgia and Atlanta averages.  These figures tell a similar story as Table 10.  Recent 
migrants from Europe and from Other North America do better than other subgroups.  
These are followed by those migrants from Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East.  
Recent migrants from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have the worst labor 
market outcomes.   
Recent immigrants from Europe have relatively high wages and are more 
likely to be employed in good jobs, and have relatively low average weeks worked 
and employment participation.  While Latin American and African immigrants have 
lower employment rates and average weeks worked than most other groups, the 
differences between these two sub-groups and the others are extremely stark in terms 
of average wage and the proportion in good jobs.  This difference is especially stark 
for Latin American immigrants; Latin American male immigrants living in Atlanta 
earn only about half as much as the average Atlantan, and are only 17 percent as 
likely to hold a good job as Atlantans.  Migrants from the rest of the United States 
outperform the other sub-groups in all categories except wages.  Asian immigrants 
display the opposite pattern, namely, low labor-market attachment but high wages 
and a high proportion in good jobs.  A similar pattern emerges for the Middle Eastern 
countries, whose migrants display low averages except for the proportion holding 
good jobs.   
Looking at these differences across measured outcomes is instructive in terms 
of fleshing out the picture offered in the discussion of the educational characteristics 
above.  The flows of immigrants from these areas are not homogenous.  Wide 
differences in the amount of human capital (in particular, education) of immigrants 
by country and differences in the distributions of human capital of immigrants from 
countries within the same region mean that implications that can be drawn from the 
group averages presented here can only go so far.  Within these groups there is 
considerable variation which we should not ignore. 
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C. Factors Associated With Labor Market Outcomes 
So far this section has examined the economic and labor market outcomes of 
recent immigrants to Georgia.  From these tables, a fairly clear picture emerges.  
Economic and labor market success in Georgia and Atlanta is strongly conditioned by 
the immigrant’s former residence.  Furthermore, the data suggest a relatively clear 
ordering of the economic position of migrants from various regions of the world.  
Long-term residents and migrants to Georgia from other states, the rest of North 
America and Europe do best.  Migrants to Atlanta from the rest of Georgia, Asia and 
Oceania do next best.  Finally, Latin American, Middle-Eastern and sub-Saharan 
African migrants do worst.  However, we saw in Section II.B that education levels 
and demographic characteristics for these groups differ substantially.  In this sub-
section we explore how much of the difference in income and labor market outcomes 
can be explained by the demographic and education characteristics of the different 
migrant groups. 
Table 13 (Table 14) reports the results of regression analysis aimed at 
answering this question for Georgia (Atlanta).  Separate regressions are estimated for 
income and each of the various labor market outcomes.  Each column of Tables 13 
and 14 reports the results of a regression that includes explanatory variables meant to 
capture demographic and education effects.6  In addition, dummy variables are 
included that reflect the previous residence.  These variables capture the association 
between past residence and labor market outcomes controlling for other determinates 
of wages.  These equations are not meant to capture causal relationships.  What they 
can tell us is whether a certain group, defined by their residence in 1995, is doing 
better or worse given their demographics and education.   
The coefficients on place of residence in 1995 reflect the amount by which 
the  labor  market  outcome  for a person from that place of residence differs from the 
                                                          
6 The two regressions on indicator variables (“Work” and “Good Job”) are linear probability 
models, so that the reported coefficients represent the predicted change in the probability of the 
better outcome given a unit change of the independent variable, all else equal.  Linear probability 
models estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) do not generate consistent standard errors.  The 
p-values in Tables 12 and 13 for these two variables are generated using Huber-White corrected 
standard errors to correct for this problem.  All the regressions are conditional on the individual 
being of working age, while the wage and “good job” regressions further condition on the 
individual reporting having worked the previous year. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 13.  REGRESSION RESULTS FOR OUTCOME VARIABLES (18-65 YEAR OLDS), ALL GEORGIA, 2000 
 ----------Inc---------- ---HH Inc/Poverty-- --------Work------- -------Weeks------ --------Wage-------- -----Good Job----- 
 Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Age 1949.0 0.000 9.037 0.000 0.0245 0.000 2.165 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.0090 0.000 
Age2 -18.2 0.000 -0.094 0.000 -0.0004 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.002 0.065 -0.0001 0.000 
Black -5348.6 0.000 -51.935 0.000 -0.0300 0.000 -2.514 0.000 -0.321 0.432 -0.0508 0.000 
Hispanic -5025.1 0.000 -36.233 0.000 0.0143 0.001 0.495 0.022 -1.672 0.074 -0.0391 0.000 
Female -18081.0 0.000 -9.459 0.000 -0.1124 0.000 -7.543 0.000 -4.549 0.000 0.0547 0.000 
Married 3043.7 0.000 73.881 0.000 0.0061 0.000 1.067 0.000 1.406 0.000 0.0340 0.000 
Children 1082.7 0.000 -24.273 0.000 -0.0081 0.000 -0.538 0.000 0.307 0.059 -0.0002 0.805 
Other GA -6968.5 0.000 -43.586 0.000 -0.0228 0.000 -1.086 0.000 -3.774 0.000 -0.0185 0.000 
Other US -4125.6 0.000 -42.783 0.000 -0.0239 0.000 -1.993 0.000 -2.273 0.000 0.0075 0.008 
Other N. Amer. -7304.7 0.001 -50.435 0.000 -0.1461 0.000 -8.234 0.000 8.927 0.114 0.0652 0.039 
Latin America -7948.8 0.000 -65.007 0.000 -0.0936 0.000 -5.910 0.000 -4.033 0.016 -0.0268 0.000 
Europe -8504.9 0.000 -67.681 0.000 -0.1004 0.000 -5.586 0.000 -2.533 0.259 -0.0452 0.000 
Mid-East -17578.9 0.000 -110.278 0.000 -0.2142 0.000 -12.162 0.000 -6.496 0.311 -0.0670 0.061 
Africa -9361.5 0.000 -59.836 0.000 -0.1021 0.000 -6.731 0.000 -1.891 0.616 -0.0643 0.000 
Asia -17775.6 0.000 -112.356 0.000 -0.1773 0.000 -10.603 0.000 -4.118 0.095 -0.0758 0.000 
Oceania -8356.8 0.000 -66.667 0.000 -0.0850 0.000 -5.025 0.000 -3.562 0.502 -0.0257 0.339 
Other -18717.6 0.136 -173.805 0.000 -0.0549 0.623 -3.590 0.606 -10.319 0.721 -0.0166 0.894 
HS Grad 6323.7 0.000 57.897 0.000 0.1321 0.000 7.613 0.000 0.152 0.780 0.0403 0.000 
Some College 12505.4 0.000 92.434 0.000 0.1878 0.000 10.265 0.000 2.475 0.000 0.1657 0.000 
BA/BS 29244.8 0.000 151.752 0.000 0.2060 0.000 11.615 0.000 10.689 0.000 0.4933 0.000 
Masters 37532.9 0.000 168.092 0.000 0.2503 0.000 13.075 0.000 12.469 0.000 0.6862 0.000 
Doc/Prof 63236.1 0.000 166.798 0.000 0.2503 0.000 13.608 0.000 28.200 0.000 0.7769 0.000 
Constant -17359.0 0.000 67.479 0.000 0.3954 0.000 -3.229 0.000 3.621 0.066 -0.1541 0.000 
             
obs 249036 249036 249036 249036 200698 200698 
r-sq 0.2267 0.3198 0.1062 0.1333 0.0108 0.2968 
 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 14.  REGRESSION RESULTS FOR OUTCOME VARIABLES (18-65 YEAR OLDS), ATLANTA MSA, 2000 
 ----------Inc---------- ---HH Inc/Poverty-- --------Work------- -------Weeks------ -------Wage------ -----Good Job----- 
 Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Age 2271.6 0.000 8.199 0.000 0.0247 0.000 2.190 0.000 0.518 0.014 0.0108 0.000 
Age2 -20.9 0.000 -0.089 0.000 -0.0004 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.002 0.434 -0.0001 0.000 
Black -7251.3 0.000 -48.599 0.000 -0.0035 0.153 -1.230 0.000 -1.769 0.023 -0.0611 0.000 
Hispanic -7098.1 0.000 -48.235 0.000 0.0033 0.555 0.083 0.765 -2.921 0.080 -0.0551 0.000 
Female -21826.1 0.000 -11.536 0.000 -0.1189 0.000 -7.684 0.000 -4.433 0.000 0.0424 0.000 
Married 2931.7 0.000 70.937 0.000 -0.0089 0.000 0.061 0.632 1.568 0.036 0.0298 0.000 
Children 947.0 0.000 -26.800 0.000 -0.0200 0.000 -1.239 0.000 0.389 0.222 -0.0016 0.167 
Other GA -5658.4 0.000 -52.260 0.000 -0.0291 0.000 -2.442 0.000 -0.665 0.723 0.0141 0.059 
Other US -951.4 0.006 -15.142 0.000 -0.0096 0.001 -1.296 0.000 -0.459 0.616 0.0254 0.000 
Other N. Amer. -5988.8 0.061 -27.634 0.007 -0.1384 0.000 -8.129 0.000 14.145 0.117 0.0612 0.129 
Latin America -5346.1 0.000 -59.514 0.000 -0.0838 0.000 -6.039 0.000 -1.785 0.522 -0.0313 0.000 
Europe -6802.5 0.000 -60.373 0.000 -0.1069 0.000 -6.935 0.000 0.932 0.825 -0.0422 0.014 
Mid-East -19043.9 0.000 -123.593 0.000 -0.2628 0.000 -14.542 0.000 -6.649 0.540 -0.0652 0.171 
Africa -7634.8 0.000 -67.506 0.000 -0.1101 0.000 -7.484 0.000 0.038 0.994 -0.0753 0.000 
Asia -19127.0 0.000 -107.461 0.000 -0.1794 0.000 -11.718 0.000 -2.323 0.564 -0.1155 0.000 
Oceania -4060.4 0.221 -28.843 0.007 -0.0536 0.075 -3.806 0.012 -0.933 0.917 -0.0132 0.702 
Other -9115.6 0.701 0.806 0.992 0.0891 0.081 7.798 0.471 -5.674 0.922 -0.1622 0.000 
HS Grad 6357.3 0.000 56.921 0.000 0.1086 0.000 6.529 0.000 -0.010 0.993 0.0396 0.000 
Some College 14477.0 0.000 93.021 0.000 0.1611 0.000 9.180 0.000 3.092 0.008 0.1700 0.000 
BA/BS 32128.8 0.000 142.208 0.000 0.1747 0.000 10.398 0.000 11.354 0.000 0.4680 0.000 
Masters 42416.8 0.000 155.107 0.000 0.2110 0.000 11.722 0.000 13.664 0.000 0.6484 0.000 
Doc/Prof 65603.3 0.000 152.662 0.000 0.2146 0.000 12.334 0.000 32.916 0.000 0.7533 0.000 
Constant -23883.9 0.000 105.792 0.000 0.4304 0.000 -1.419 0.030 0.820 0.837 -0.1597 0.000 
             
obs 110839 110839 110839 110839 93096 93096 
r-sq 0.2286 0.3131 0.0996 0.1305 0.0085 0.2689 
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labor market outcome for individuals who resided in Atlanta in 1995, controlling for 
demographic characteristics and education.   
Several of the explanatory variables are called “dummy variables.”  They take 
on the value of zero or one.  For example, consider the variable, “female.”  For the 
regression, females are given a value of one and males are given a value of zero.  The 
coefficient on female measures the influence on, say income, of being female rather 
than male.  For the education variables, each of the coefficients on these variables 
measures the effect of having, say, a college degree rather than not having a high 
school degree. We say that not having a high school degree is the excluded category 
since there is no variable included for that education level.  For the place of residence 
in 1995 variables, each of the coefficients measures the influence of being from a 
given area rather than from Atlanta.  
Before turning to the analysis of the effects of previous residence, some 
general comments are in order.  First, in general, the coefficients for the set of both 
the education and demographic variables and the previous residence variables are 
highly statistically significant. Although the explanatory power of the regressions 
varies across labor market outcome variables, they are generally comfortably high.  
The exception is the wage equation, where less than one percent of the variation in 
wage is explained by the explanatory variables.  This seems to be a result of wage 
being a very noisy measure.7   
The results for Georgia (Table 13) and Atlanta (Table 14) are qualitatively 
similar.  We focus on the results for the Atlanta metropolitan area.  In general, the 
demographic and education variables are consistent with expectations:  
● age is generally a positive factor with a decreasing effect (note the 
negative coefficient on age squared); 
 
                                                          
7 Wage was calculated by adding wage and salary income to self employment income and dividing 
the sum by the product of weeks worked and average hours per week.  As these are all self-
reported measures, the noise in each measure may be compounded.  Regressions similar to the one 
reported were run using only wage and salary income as a base for wage, and excluding anyone 
reporting any self-employment income.  The results for these regressions had marginally better 
predictive power (0.02 and 0.03, respectively), but the coefficients were not noticeably changed.  
Adding industry and occupation controls had little effect as well.  We conclude therefore that mis-
reporting in the hours per week and weeks worked categories are adding noise to this measure, 
lowering the predictive power of the regression.  Thus, the results on wages should be interpreted 
with care.  
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● women have worse outcomes than males; 
 
● blacks and Hispanics generally have worse outcomes than whites; 
 
● married people generally have better outcomes than singles;  and 
 
● the effect of the number of children is mixed across the regressions.   
 
The education variables are generally statistically significant and display the expected 
trend (i.e., larger coefficients for higher education levels).  (As noted above, the 
excluded category is less than a high school degree.)  Most of these coefficients are 
statistically significant, even in the noisy wage regression.   
Turning to the coefficients on previous residence, the excluded category is 
people who resided in Atlanta in 1995.  The coefficient of -5658.4 on “Other GA” in 
the first column of Table 14 can thus be interpreted as implying that, holding 
demographics and education constant, an Atlanta resident who lived elsewhere in 
Georgia in 1995 will on average make about $5,658 less than an observationally 
identical Atlantan who lived in Atlanta in 1995.  With the exception of Europe and 
Africa in the wage equation, coefficients on the variables reflecting residence outside 
of North America are uniformly negative.  For the non-wage equations, the only 
positive coefficients on prior place of residence in 1995 are in the good job equation 
for previous residency in other parts of North America, other U.S. states, and non-
Atlanta parts of Georgia.  This means that on average, longer-term residents of 
Atlanta do better than other groups, even accounting for differences in demographic 
characteristics and education.   
The other areas of the world can be characterized (loosely) as follows.  In the 
first tier of 1995 place of residence (those with the smallest coefficients and thus the 
smallest difference with 1995 Atlanta residents), are other U.S. states and Oceania.  
Across the six equations, these areas have worse outcomes than Atlantans who 
resided in Atlanta in 1995 (conditional on demographics and education), but 
generally better than the rest of the 1995 place of residence.  The next group consists 
of Latin America, other parts of Georgia, and Europe.8  Migrants from these areas 
                                                          
8 Other parts of Georgia are in the top tier in the regressions using data from the entire state, and 
Oceania falls into the second group. 
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might be doing better because of thicker social connections: with the exception of 
Oceania and Asia (which is absent), the top groups are made up of the dominant 
population groups in Atlanta.  The group of areas whose former residents do worst 
(again, conditional on their demographics and education) include Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa (disregarding Africa’s anomalous performance in the wage equation).  
The coefficient on former residence elsewhere in North America (mostly Canadians) 
fluctuates across equations, so it is hard to place it in one of these groups.9   
These results show that the disparities in income observed in Tables 10 and 
11 are not simply artifacts of observed differences in worker characteristics.  Even 
when controlling for these characteristics, recent immigrants do significantly worse 
than longer-term residents.  There are several possible explanations for this 
(unsurprising) result.  On the one hand, the negative coefficients for most of the 
foreign residence variables could be picking up unmeasured differences in ability or 
quality of education.  For instance, a high-school degree in Latin America might not 
prepare recipients for the American labor market as well as a domestic high-school 
degree, or a deficiency in spoken English may be constraining these immigrants’ 
earning potential.  Another possibility is that recent immigrants are discriminated 
against in local labor markets, so that immigrants get paid less, or have harder times 
getting jobs or hours of work than U.S. natives and longer-time residents of Atlanta.  
Another possibility is that cultural influences predispose immigrants from other 
countries towards different kinds of industries and/or occupations that may pay lower 
wages.  A fifth possibility is that good labor-market outcomes are facilitated by thick 
and/or broad social networks, which recent immigrants would likely lack when they 
first arrive.10   
It is likely that most of these impediments to income and wage growth should 
dissipate with time.  That is, as immigrants gain more experience in the U.S., their 
language proficiency will improve, their cultural preferences will become more like 
natives, and their skills and social networks will become more adapted to the native 
                                                          
9 In the full Georgia sample, North Americans from outside the United States are generally in the 
top group, except in the “work” and “weeks” regressions.   
10 The negative coefficient on previous residence in other states in the U.S. suggests that this could 
be an important explanation, as these new-comers will have more or less similar back grounds in 
terms of culture and skills, and are unlikely to be discriminated against.   
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terrain.  This process of adaptation to the new surroundings, which is referred to as 
assimilation, is an important part of the American experience.   
While this section has asked how recent migrants have fared since arriving, 
the next section will take up the question of how migrants have assimilated.  That is, 
we examine whether they are likely to catch up, or continue to lag behind the native 
populations in terms of income and labor market outcomes. 
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IV. How Will Migrants Do Over Time? 
To determine how well Atlanta and Georgia’s recent immigrants fare in the 
future in terms of their economic well being, we could wait and interview them again 
at some future date.  While this is certainly possible, it would not inform us today 
about these likely future outcomes.  To do that, we have to predict what will happen 
to recent immigrants.  One way to do that is to observe what happened to immigrants 
who have been here longer.  This requires making some additional assumptions, and 
to the extent that these assumptions are not valid, our predictions will be in error.11 
Our general method of predicting recent migrants’ future economic 
assimilation is to assume that they will assimilate in a manner similar to migrants 
from the same countries that have been here longer.  For this comparison to give us 
valid insight into the expected economic assimilation of recent migrants, we must be 
willing to assume that the recent migrants are not substantially different from 
previous groups of migrants from the same countries.  That is, we have to assume that 
the group of migrants has not become more or less selective over the course of the 
1990’s, especially in the unobservable characteristics for which we cannot control in 
regressions.12 
Another assumption we must make is that the economy of Georgia and 
Atlanta will not treat immigrants fundamentally differently in the future than in the 
1990s.  That is, if the Atlanta economy (where most of the recent immigrants have 
worked) was very welcoming to immigrant labor in the 1980s and early 1990s, but 
has become less (more) welcoming to those kinds of laborers since then, we would be 
lead  to  be  overly   optimistic   (pessimistic)   about   the   prospects   of   the   recent  
                                                          
11 All predictions end up in error, because the future is uncertain.  Good predictions will never be 
exactly correct, but we might expect the predictions to be unbiased, or be correct on average.  
However, if predictions are made on faulty assumptions, they will not only have the standard error 
due to the future’s uncertainty, but will also systematically tend to point in the wrong direction.  
12 Our assumption here is similar to that of Chiswick (1978) where cross-sectional evidence 
suggests that recent immigrants to the U.S. are assimilating in that their employment outcomes are 
converging to those of U.S. natives.  However, Borjas (1985) calls Chiswick’s results into 
question.  Borjas claims that there was a deterioration of immigrant cohort quality during the 
period Chiswick studies and that an assessment of assimilation requires panel data.  Borjas’ 
assertions suggest that our evidence should be read with caution.   
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immigrants.  The following discussion of the future prospects of recent immigrants 
must be interpreted through the lens of these two assumptions.   
It is instructive to first look at how the incomes differ for recent and longer-
standing immigrants.  Table 15 presents average income and the average of income as 
a percent of the poverty level.  Table 16 reports two statistics for each variable and 
country of origin.  The first statistic is the percentage difference in the income of 
long-term migrants to that of recent migrants from the specified geographic area.  
Thus, the value of 15.1 percent in the first row of Table 16 is the percentage 
difference in the incomes in the first two rows of the first column of Table 15.  The 
value means that the average income for all Georgians born in other U.S. states is 
15.1 percent higher than the average income of recent migrants to Georgia from other 
U.S. states.  One could think of this figure as giving a measure of “assimilation,” at 
least in the dimension being quantified in the tables.   
The numbers in the second row of Table 16 compare the assimilation of all of 
the relevant migrant categories to the assimilation of migrants from other U.S. states.  
Thus, the second number in the second row, 20.9 percent, is the percentage difference 
between the first and second numbers in the first row, i.e., 15.1 percent and 18.1 
percent, and means that migrants from other parts of North America assimilated 
about 21 percent faster than migrants from other U.S. states.13  We focus on the 
numbers in the first row, i.e., the assimilation measure. 
The statistics reported in Tables 15 and 16 are encouraging.  Assimilation was 
significant for every migrant group, and assimilation of international migrants 
outpaced that of U.S. internal migrants.  Most encouragingly, those recent migrant 
groups that had the lowest average income (Africans, Latin Americans and Middle-
Easterners) had the larger assimilation gains for income.  
                                                          
13 Henceforth, we will loosely use the terms “assimilate” and “assimilation” to signify growth in 
these desirable labor-market outcomes.  We use migrants from other parts of the United States as a 
comparison group for two reasons. First, data on point of birth does not differentiate those born in 
Atlanta from those born in the rest of Georgia.   Second, migrants from other parts of the United 
States represent an attractive baseline in terms of “assimilation.”  These migrants do not have to 
learn new languages, customs or institutions, so their improvements in situation can be taken as a 
kind of natural improvement attendant on mere residence in the area.  One would hope that 
immigrants from foreign countries, who start generally behind these U.S. internal migrants, would 
assimilate more quickly so that they can catch up to the native population. 
TABLE 15.  COMPARISON OF RECENT AND LONG-STANDING IMMIGRANTS BY AREA, INCOME VARIABLES, 2000 
  
Immigrant 
---------------------------------------------------------------Region-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Economic 
Measure 
 
Other 
U.S. 
Other 
North 
America 
 
 
Europe 
 
Latin 
America 
 
Middle-
East 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Oceania 
-
-
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
-
-
-
 
Income Long-term $33,263 $38,130 $32,393 $16,618 $34,159 $23,562 $26,387 $26,335 Recent $28,904 $32,250 $24,884 $11,037 $19,774 $15,615 $19,022 $19,620 
          
HH inc/ 
Poverty 
Long-term 331 365 335 215 312 270 319 282 
Recent 298 326 268 176 256 220 252 240 
           
-
-
-
A
t
l
a
n
t
a
-
-
-
 
Income Long-term $39,600 $43,234 $38,618 $18,163 $33,699 $23,114 $27,681 $31,324 Recent $33,915 $35,134 $29,477 $11,793 $18,910 $15,234 $19,904 $23,314 
          
HH inc/ 
Poverty 
Long-term 369 387 362 232 310 269 333 316 
Recent 339 373 294 190 253 221 270 285 
 
 
 
TABLE 16.  COMPARISON OF “ASSIMILATION” TO U.S. INTERNAL MIGRANTS, INCOME VARIABLES, 2000 
  
Immigrant 
--------------------------------------------------------Region-------------------------------------------------------- 
 Economic 
Measure 
 
Other 
U.S. 
Other 
North 
America 
 
 
Europe 
 
Latin 
America 
 
Middle-
East 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Oceania 
-
-
-
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
-
-
-
 
Income Long-term/recent 15.1% 18.2% 30.2% 50.6% 72.7% 50.9% 38.7% 34.2% Comp. U.S. 0.0 20.9% 100.1% 235.3% 382.3% 237.4% 156.7% 126.9% 
          
HH inc/ 
Poverty 
Long-term/recent 10.9% 11.9% 24.7% 21.9% 22.0% 22.4% 26.7% 17.7% 
Comp. U.S. 0.0 9.0% 125.6% 100.1% 101.2% 104.6% 143.9% 61.7% 
           
-
-
-
A
t
l
a
n
t
a
-
-
-
 
Income Long-term/recent 16.8% 23.1% 31.0% 54.0% 78.2% 51.7% 39.1% 34.4% Comp. U.S. 0.0 37.6% 85.0% 222.2% 366.6% 208.6% 133.1% 105.0% 
          
HH inc/ 
Poverty 
Long-term/recent 9.1% 3.7% 22.9% 22.1% 22.3% 21.6% 23.3% 10.8% 
Comp. U.S. 0.0 -59.1 152.8% 143.8% 146.1% 137.9% 156.6% 18.9% 
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Tables 17 and 18 report equivalent statistics for the labor market variables. 
(The second row for employment rate is meaningless since the percentage change for 
migrants from other states is negative.)  These results are slightly mixed, although 
still generally positive, that is; longer-term migrants have better outcomes than recent 
migrants.  In general, the assimilation measures for the labor market outcomes are 
much smaller than for income.  Second, the assimilation of the various groups is not 
as consistently positive as for income.14  
Examining the results for employment rate, recent migrants from other U.S. 
states are actually more likely to work than all migrants from other U.S. states.  It is 
possible, although unlikely, that this could represent early retirement of previous 
migrants.  It is also possible that recent migrants are more likely to be college 
educated (who are more likely to be employed) or less likelihood that households are 
headed by females (who are less likely to work).  This negative assimilation by inter-
state migrants is not substantively large, and probably has to do with the role that job 
mobility plays in inter-state migration: U.S. migrants are unlikely to undertake costly 
moves to new cities unless they have a job lined up (Bartel 1979).  However, the 
results for migrants from other countries all point towards strong assimilation in the 
ability to find jobs.  For Atlanta, the employment rate of all those born in foreign 
countries compared to more recent migrants suggest a 4.5 percent to 18 percent 
increase in the employment rate as the immigrants assimilate to American 
institutions.   
For number of weeks worked, assimilation effects are even stronger.   For 
example, Atlanta immigrants from every country except Canada had assimilation of 
over 10 percent, which is from four to ten times larger than for U.S. internal 
migrants.15 
In terms of the kind of work these immigrants are finding, the results are 
slightly more mixed.  Estimated hourly wage suggests that migrants from three areas 
(North America, Asia, and Oceania) actually had negative assimilation, so that those 
born in these areas make less on average than recent immigrants from these areas.   
                                                          
14 The discussion will concentrate on the figures for the Atlanta sub-sample, however the 
qualitative statements hold for the full Georgia Sample as well. 
15 Immigrants from other North American countries assimilated about 66% faster than U.S. 
internal migrants. 
 
 
 
TABLE 17.  COMPARISON OF RECENT AND LONG-STANDING IMMIGRANTS BY AREA (ALL MALES AGED 18-65), WORK VARIABLES, 
2000 
   ----------------------------------------------------------Region--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Economic 
Measure Immigrant 
 
Other 
U.S. 
Other 
North 
America 
 
 
Europe 
 
Latin 
America 
 
Middle-
East 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Oceania 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 Work Long-term 0.9034 0.9271 0.9163 0.8743 0.9024 0.8773 0.8961 0.9039 Recent 0.9075 0.8710 0.8628 0.8043 0.8108 0.8157 0.8430 0.8392 
          
Weeks  Long-term 43.07 43.36 43.48 38.97 42.92 39.77 41.56 42.37 Recent 42.19 40.97 40.48 33.66 36.88 34.90 36.99 37.56 
          
Wage Long-term 23.38 26.03 25.72 14.08 25.03 18.31 22.69 18.66 Recent 20.40 28.22 20.71 11.01 17.01 17.37 21.60 17.57 
          
"Good" job Long-term 0.3495 0.5385 0.4254 0.0860 0.4878 0.2625 0.3859 0.2707 Recent 0.3435 0.5565 0.3105 0.0525 0.3423 0.1638 0.3965 0.2098 
           
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
t
l
a
n
t
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 Work Long-term 0.9302 0.9425 0.9231 0.8862 0.8997 0.8823 0.9112 0.9522 Recent 0.9313 0.9024 0.8571 0.8284 0.7606 0.8354 0.8608 0.8750 
          
Weeks  Long-term 44.65 44.19 44.06 39.59 42.86 39.98 42.29 45.53 Recent 43.67 42.60 39.40 34.52 34.92 35.80 36.53 39.94 
          
Wage Long-term 26.69 26.47 28.59 14.70 25.22 17.56 23.71 20.29 Recent 23.41 30.46 25.88 11.84 16.96 17.34 25.35 20.55 
          
"Good" job Long-term 0.4179 0.5690 0.4882 0.0989 0.4819 0.2465 0.3931 0.3435 Recent 0.4154 0.6463 0.3724 0.0564 0.3521 0.1564 0.4367 0.2917 
 
 
  
 
 
 
TABLE 18.  COMPARISON OF “ASSIMILATION” TO U.S. INTERNAL MIGRANTS (ALL MALES AGED 18-65), WORK VARIABLES, 2000 
   ------------------------------------------------------------Region----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Economic 
Measure Immigrant 
 
Other 
U.S. 
Other 
North 
America 
 
 
Europe 
 
Latin 
America 
 
Middle-
East 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Oceania 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 Work Long-term/recent -0.5% 6.4% 6.2% 8.7% 11.3% 7.5% 6.3% 7.7% Comp. U.S. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
           
Weeks  Long-term/recent 2.1% 5.8% 7.4% 15.8% 16.4% 13.9% 12.4% 12.8% Comp. U.S. 0.0% 78.6% 154.9% 553.1% 581.9% 465.6% 390.2% 412.2% 
           
Wage Long-term/recent 14.6% -7.7% 24.1% 27.8% 47.2% 5.4% 5.0% 6.2% Comp. U.S. 0.0% -253.0% -34.7% -9.6% 122.9% -163.3% -165.7% -157.2% 
           
"Good" job Long-term/recent 1.7% -3.2% 37.0% 63.6% 42.5% 60.2% -2.7% 29.1% Comp. U.S. 0.0% -385.1% 1920.2% 3443.4% 2233.2% 3247.7% -353.4% 1463.7% 
           
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A
t
l
a
n
t
a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 Work Long-term/recent -0.1% 4.4% 7.7% 7.0% 18.3% 5.6% 5.9% 8.8% Comp. U.S. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
           
Weeks  Long-term/recent 2.2% 3.7% 11.8% 14.7% 22.7% 11.7% 15.8% 14.0% Comp. U.S. 0.0% -33.3% 327.8% 455.8% 814.8% 319.9% 503.0% 423.4% 
           
Wage Long-term/recent 14.0% -13.1% 10.5% 24.2% 48.8% 1.3% -6.5% -1.2% Comp. U.S. 0.0% -293.5% -125.4% -27.6% 148.0% -191.0% -246.2% -208.8% 
           
"Good" job Long-term/recent 0.6% -12.0% 31.1% 75.3% 36.9% 57.7% -10.0% 17.8% Comp. U.S. 0.0% -2216.0% 5032.0% 12488.7% 6006.9% 9509.0% -1881.3% 2791.5% 
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This might be a result of the noisiness of the wage measure as discussed in Section 
III.  However, wage assimilation for internal migrants to Atlanta was a strong 14 
percent, and wage assimilation was positive for another three areas (Latin America, 
the Middle East and Europe), although it was essentially zero for Africa.  For 
migrants from Latin America and the Middle East, the assimilation was greater than 
for U.S. internal migrants (72 percent and 250 percent faster, respectively, for 
Atlanta).   
For the proportion of each group that has a good job, as defined in footnote 5 
in Section III, the results are still mixed, but more optimistic.  Two groups have 
negative assimilation in terms of having good jobs: Asians and Canadians.  However, 
these two groups have the largest shares of good jobs when they first arrive, so this 
movement can be thought of as assimilation towards an American norm, even if the 
assimilation is somewhat perverse.  For the U.S. internal migrants, there is basically 
no change.  However, for immigrants from the rest of the world, the gains are large.  
For Atlanta, assimilation for Oceania (18 percent), Europe (31 percent), the Middle-
East (37 percent), Africa (58 percent) and Latin America (75 percent) are all very 
high.   
Together, these results suggest that immigrants to Atlanta and to Georgia do 
start out with a disadvantage, but that over time we can expect them (like most 
previous groups of immigrants) to close the gap with the native population.  Of 
course, the figures in Tables 15-18 are simple averages, and do not control for any of 
the important covariates of income or labor market outcomes.   
In Tables 19 and 20, we report regression analysis along the lines of that 
reported in Tables 13 and 14, except that place of birth is added to the regression as 
another dummy variable.  By controlling for both residence five years prior to the 
census and place of birth, we are able to distinguish between long-established 
immigrants and more recent arrivals.  A recent arrival from another part of the world 
will have both their place of birth and their residence five years prior in their native 
country, while long-established immigrants will have only their place of birth set to 
that area.  Thus, comparing the coefficients on these two variables enables us to get a 
qualitative sense of how much of an immigrant’s initial disadvantage (represented by 
the  usually  negative  coefficients  on  the  residence  five  years  prior  variable)  will 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 19.  REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR PLACE OF BIRTH AND PREVIOUS RESIDENCE, ALL GEORGIA, 2000 
  -------Income------- Income/Poverty --------Work-------- ------Weeks------ --------Wage-------- -------Good Job------ 
Area Immigrant Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val 
Other 
U.S. 
Birth 2444.7 0.000 6.53 0.000 0.0132 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.844 0.035 0.0160 0.000 
5-yr -4838.0 0.000 -44.76 0.051 -0.0280 0.000 -2.192 0.000 -2.522 0.000 0.0030 0.307 
Other N. 
America 
Birth 2608.0 0.109 12.41 0.000 -0.0035 0.831 -0.387 0.669 0.616 0.873 0.1139 0.000 
5-yr -6797.6 0.004 -51.69 0.002 -0.1389 0.000 -7.739 0.000 9.181 0.117 0.0305 0.338 
Latin 
America 
Birth -1327.8 0.029 7.41 0.000 0.0486 0.000 2.690 0.000 -0.435 0.763 -0.0130 0.053 
5-yr -7190.1 0.000 -66.63 0.000 -0.1080 0.000 -6.714 0.000 -3.767 0.233 -0.0207 0.000 
Europe Birth 1567.9 0.012 9.70 0.000 -0.0046 0.469 -0.621 0.075 0.796 0.592 0.0127 0.119 5-yr -8821.8 0.000 -70.30 0.000 -0.0975 0.000 -5.307 0.000 -2.735 0.233 -0.0495 0.000 
Middle-
East 
Birth -6869.5 0.000 -39.21 0.000 -0.0757 0.000 -4.558 0.000 -0.569 0.859 -0.0339 0.063 
5-yr -12922 0.000 -86.74 0.000 -0.1687 0.000 -9.452 0.000 -5.960 0.365 -0.0459 0.207 
Africa Birth -7851.9 0.000 -15.01 0.000 -0.0035 0.730 -0.590 0.310 -4.744 0.053 -0.0416 0.001 5-yr -3572.2 0.030 -48.09 0.000 -0.0959 0.000 -6.140 0.000 1.430 0.728 -0.0336 0.066 
Asia Birth -6259.2 0.000 -14.98 0.000 -0.0167 0.005 -1.182 0.000 -1.995 0.138 -0.0782 0.000 5-yr -13084 0.000 -100.68 0.441 -0.1619 0.000 -9.617 0.000 -2.738 0.288 -0.0266 0.051 
Oceania Birth 959.4 0.460 3.91 0.000 0.0152 0.246 0.968 0.180 0.577 0.852 0.0045 0.770 5-yr -8680.4 0.000 -66.09 0.000 -0.0810 0.001 -4.869 0.000 -3.794 0.489 -0.0283 0.306 
r-sq 0.2283 0.32 0.1067 0.134 0.011 0.2979 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 20.  REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR PLACE OF BIRTH AND PREVIOUS RESIDENCE, ATLANTA MSA, 2000 
  -------Income------- Income/Poverty --------Work-------- ------Weeks------ --------Wage-------- -------Good Job------ 
Area Immigrant Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val Coef p-val 
Other 
U.S. 
Birth 3620.0 0.000 14.39 0.000 0.0242 0.000 1.253 0.000 1.350 0.080 0.0230 0.000 
5-yr -1887.7 0.000 -19.12 0.000 -0.0177 0.000 -1.710 0.000 -0.809 0.394 0.0200 0.000 
Other N. 
America 
Birth 2367.7 0.305 8.68 0.242 -0.0052 0.789 -0.619 0.556 0.403 0.948 0.1008 0.000 
5-yr -4506.1 0.179 -22.80 0.034 -0.1282 0.000 -7.379 0.000 14.840 0.115 0.0325 0.429 
Latin 
America 
Birth -1025.0 0.246 -1.59 0.576 0.0445 0.000 2.626 0.000 -0.269 0.909 -0.0196 0.025 
5-yr -4643.4 0.000 -57.42 0.000 -0.0956 0.000 -6.721 0.000 -1.628 0.786 -0.0233 0.004 
Europe Birth 2052.3 0.037 10.39 0.001 0.0037 0.657 -0.240 0.591 0.150 0.954 0.0263 0.021 5-yr -6922.3 0.000 -61.98 0.000 -0.1030 0.000 -6.497 0.000 1.195 0.786 -0.0517 0.004 
Middle-
East 
Birth -10331.0 0.000 -48.27 0.000 -0.0602 0.000 -3.791 0.000 -2.220 0.641 -0.0311 0.137 
5-yr -10756.7 0.003 -86.66 0.000 -0.2152 0.000 -11.610 0.000 -4.819 0.667 -0.0396 0.417 
Africa Birth -8315.3 0.000 -24.90 0.000 -0.0106 0.332 -1.041 0.082 -4.975 0.154 -0.0410 0.003 5-yr -784.4 0.709 -45.97 0.000 -0.0956 0.000 -6.370 0.000 3.852 0.511 -0.0411 0.037 
Asia Birth -7917.0 0.000 -16.16 0.000 0.0111 0.104 0.207 0.568 -2.893 0.173 -0.0927 0.000 5-yr -11877.4 0.000 -89.84 0.000 -0.1779 0.000 -11.368 0.000 0.223 0.958 -0.0422 0.014 
Oceania Birth 3540.3 0.086 16.07 0.015 0.0304 0.073 2.517 0.007 -0.359 0.948 0.0139 0.510 5-yr -5163.8 0.136 -34.03 0.002 -0.0571 0.068 -4.387 0.005 -0.508 0.957 -0.0183 0.608 
r-sq 0.2317 0.3162 0.1008 0.1318 0.0080 0.2711 
Note: all regressions also include controls for age, age-squared, race, Hispanic ethnicity, sex, marital status, number of children, and a battery of education 
dummies.  For readability, these coefficients are not reported.  Sample sizes are the same as reported in Table 13. 
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dissipate as the individual assimilates to American culture and institutions 
(represented by the coefficients on the place of birth variables).  The excluded 
categories for these two sets of dummy variables are individuals born in Georgia and 
individuals who lived in Georgia in 1995. 
The regressions include the demographic and education variables used in the 
regression reported in Table 13, but only the coefficients for the immigration 
variables are reported in Tables 19 and 20.  None of the coefficients on the 
demographic and education variables is unexpected.  The discussion below focuses 
on the results for Georgia, but the qualitative pattern is the same for Atlanta. 
To aid in the interpretation of these results, we will discuss the results for two 
geographic areas for the income regression in some detail, and then discuss the rest of 
the table in broader terms.  In the first column of coefficients in Table 19 the 
coefficient on residence five years prior for Europeans is -$8,822, meaning that 
controlling for education and demographics, recent immigrants from Europe make 
$8,822 less than individuals who lived in Georgia in 1995.  However, people born in 
Europe make about $1,570 more than native Georgians, all else constant.  Since 
people who resided in Europe five years before the 2000 census were also likely born 
in Europe,16 a recent immigrant from Europe would be expected to make around 
$7,250 dollars less than a native Georgian, controlling for demographics and 
education.  However, for longer-term migrants only the $1,500 positive coefficient of 
being born in Europe would apply; the negative $8,800 coefficient on being a recent 
immigrant would not apply since the individual is not a recent migrant.  This means 
that longer-term migrants would be expected to have an income $1,500 more than the 
native Georgian.  For Europeans, the regression suggests that the assimilation process 
(at least in terms of income) leaves them better off than native Georgians. 
The situation differs somewhat for immigrants from Latin America.  Recent 
immigrants from Latin American countries make over $7,190 less than Georgians 
                                                          
16 Interestingly, the majority of those Georgians who lived in Europe in 1995 were not born in 
Europe.  The same counter-intuitive pattern holds for North America (Canada) and Oceania and 
the U.S. Islands.  The intuitive pattern just barely holds for Middle-Eastern countries.  To some 
extent, this could be an artifact of military families: when the sample is restricted to the Atlanta 
metropolitan area, all three counter intuitive patterns shift so that the majority of previous 
residents were actually born in the area they resided in, although the majority is not always very 
large.   
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(controlling for demographics and education), while those born in Latin America 
make about $1,330 less than Georgia natives with similar demographics and 
education.  This means that recent migrants (who were also born in Latin America) 
would make about $8,520 less than Georgia natives with similar backgrounds.  
However, over time the negative $7,200 effect of being a recent immigrant 
disappears, but their income will still be less than observationally comparable natives 
by about $1,300.  They will have made great strides towards catching up, all else 
equal, but will still fall below Georgia natives.   
The majority of the pairs of coefficients on place of birth and five-years prior 
across the six reported regressions fit one of the two patterns discussed above: the 
coefficient on residence five years prior is negative, and the coefficient on place of 
birth is either positive (as for Europe) or negative (as for Latin Americans).  The six 
exceptions are either in the wage equation, which as discussed above is very noisy, or 
for migrants from the developed world (other U.S. states, Canada, or Europe).  There 
are also three regressions for migrants from other U.S. states that exhibit 
“assimilation,” but which start out from a higher than expected average.17   
Table 21 presents standardized “assimilation” statistics for Atlanta.  The 
assimilation statistic equals the percent of the original migrant gap (in income, weeks 
worked, wage, etc.) that disappears with assimilation.18  In particular, it is measured 
as the coefficient on residence five years prior variable divided by the difference in 
the coefficients on place of birth and residence five years prior.   If the assimilation 
statistic is less than one (as it is for Latin America for income), assimilation has been 
only partially successful, i.e., long-established immigrants close the gap with 
observationally equivalent natives but are unable to catch them up.  If the assimilation  
                                                          
17 That is, the coefficient on place of birth is greater in magnitude than the coefficient on recent 
residence so that even when these migrants are recently arrived in Atlanta, they earned more than 
observationally similar natives. 
18 The statistic is computed by taking negative of the coefficient on recent residence abroad and 
dividing that number by the absolute value of the sum of the birth place dummy coefficient and 
the recent residence abroad coefficient.  The denominator represents the income (or weeks 
worked, or wage, etc.) gap that the migrant faces in the first several years of residence in Atlanta 
(compared to an observationally equivalent native).  The numerator represents the amount of the 
gap that disappears with assimilation because this (often) negative coefficient disappears after 
about five years of residence.   
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TABLE 21.  “STANDARDIZED” ASSIMILATION, ATLANTA MSA, 2000 
Area 
 
Income 
 
Income/Pov 
 
Work 
 
Weeks 
 
Wage 
Good 
Job 
Other U.S. 1.090 4.043 2.686 3.744 1.495 -0.466 
Other N. America 2.107 1.615 0.961 0.923 -0.974 -0.244 
Latin America 0.819 0.973 1.870 1.641 0.858 0.543 
Europe 1.421 1.201 1.037 0.964 -0.889 2.035 
Middle-East 0.510 0.642 0.782 0.754 0.685 0.560 
Africa 0.086 0.649 0.900 0.860 -3.432 0.500 
Asia 0.600 0.848 1.067 1.019 -0.083 0.313 
Oceania 3.181 1.895 2.137 2.346 0.586 4.150 
Note:  Italicized assimilation numbers represent estimates for area effects imply that the 
migrant always made more than observationally equivalent natives (regression away from the 
mean).  Underlined numbers represent estimates of “negative” assimilation where long-term 
migrants are more like observationally equivalent natives (regression to the mean from positive 
values).  Boldfaced numbers represent estimates where negative assimilation made the migrant 
group even more disadvantaged than observationally equivalent natives (regression away from 
the mean). 
 
statistic is more than one (as it is for Europe for income), assimilation has more than 
compensated for the initial negative labor market outcome.   
The attractive aspect of this measure is that it is based on regression output, 
so that the gaps in income or labor market success cannot be attributed to any of the 
demographic or educational variables, since we control for those characteristics.  One 
unattractive feature of this measure is that for those geographic areas where the initial 
gap, i.e., the coefficient on the residence five years prior variable, is extremely close 
to zero (either positive or negative), the standardized assimilation statistic will be 
very large if there is any assimilation at all.   
The standardized assimilation statistics tell a broadly optimistic story about 
the prospects of immigrants to Atlanta.  Almost every migrant group appears to 
experience some assimilation, although the strongest assimilators are from developed 
countries (the U.S., Canada or Europe).  Even immigrants from the developing world, 
however, were able to catch up to observationally similar natives.  Immigrants from 
Oceania had the largest assimilation statistics among immigrant groups.  Latin 
American immigrants also assimilated very strongly, making up at least 80 percent of 
the initial gap, and overtaking them on some labor market outcomes.  One exception 
to this pattern is for good job, for which Latin Americans made up only about half the 
gap. 
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The assimilation for the other parts of the world (Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East) was not as strong.  It is hard to rank the assimilation experiences of immigrants 
from these three areas.  Middle Easterners consistently assimilated 50-80 percent of 
the initial gap, while the assimilation for Africans and Asians is much more erratic 
(even if we ignore the negative assimilation in wages).  Asians do better than 
Africans for every labor market outcome other than for good job.  In some 
dimensions (i.e., whether the respondent worked and the number of weeks worked) 
Asian immigrants actually over-take observationally equivalent native Atlantans.  
Asians also assimilate better than Middle-Easterners in four of the six outcome 
categories, but do worse in two (wage and good job).  Africans and Middle Easterners 
are about even on two dimensions, and split the other four.   
The assimilation results can be broadly characterized as follows.  All groups 
experienced strong assimilation.  While some immigrant groups overtook similar 
natives as they became accustomed to the U.S. labor market, others were only able to 
close the gap, without pulling even.  The assimilation experience of the migrants 
from these different parts of the world can be categorized into tiers, with the first tier 
containing the most successful assimilators.  In the first tier are the U.S., Canada, and 
Europe, in the second tier are Latin America and Oceania, and in the bottom tier are 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East.   
It is interesting to compare these to the tiers specified in Section III, which 
loosely ranked areas based on how the recent migrants did, controlling for 
demographics and education.  Those tiers ranked other U.S. states and Oceania in the 
top tier; Latin America, Europe and other parts of Georgia in the second, and Asia, 
Africa and the Middle-East in the bottom tier.   While it is encouraging that every 
group experienced significant assimilation, it is discouraging that those groups whose 
recent migrants do worst (controlling for demographics and education) are also those 
with the weakest assimilation.  That is, while all groups improve their status with 
time, the ones that start out most behind make the least progress.19  This is troubling 
because it suggests that, while the American and Atlanta economy allow all groups to 
                                                          
19 In terms of the coefficients and statistics used in the paper, we are saying that in general, the 
groups with the strongest negative coefficients of recent residence also have the strongest negative 
coefficients of birth origin, so that even after the “recent migration” effect goes away, these people 
are still left further behind than the other groups.   
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improve their economic situations, certain groups find themselves in a better position 
to capitalize on those opportunities than others, and these differences do not go away 
very quickly.  It is not possible to determine with the data available whether these 
persistent differences are the results of differences in educational quality, 
discrimination, or culture.  However, the mechanism by which these gaps are 
generated and maintained have profound effects on the policy tool, if any, we might 
apply towards the elimination of the gaps.   
 It is also not obvious that the standardized gaps and assimilation computed 
from the regression output should be the focus of policy effort.  Should it matter that 
an immigrant group has assimilated so that their income matches that of equivalent 
native Atlantans, but demographics characteristics and education levels result in low 
incomes.  The answer to this question depends on a person’s own beliefs about the 
role of government, the efficacy of government intervention, the place of first 
generation immigrants in society, and the likely outcomes for their children, the 
second generation Americans.  For this reason, both the regression output and the 
conditional averages have been presented in this report. 
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V. Conclusion 
With Atlanta at its center, Georgia has experienced a recent influx of 
immigrants.  While the experience of Atlanta in this regard is by no means unique, 
this influx of new immigrants is an important component of Atlanta’s and Georgia’s 
growth and population.  International migrants make up over ten percent of metro 
Atlanta’s population, and recent immigrants make up almost four percent.   
 This report has endeavored to understand where these immigrants are coming 
from and how they are doing.  It also ventured guesses about how well they might 
assimilate, based on experiences of their longer-established compatriots.  The 
findings of this report can be summarized as follows. 
1) The most important flow of migrants is from other U.S. states.  This 
group makes up the vast majority of non-native Georgians and 
Atlantans.  The flow into Atlanta of other Americans dwarfs the flow 
from the rest of Georgia and the rest of the world combined. 
 
2) Migration is incredibly important to Atlanta and Georgia.  For example, 
in 2000, less than half of Atlanta’s residents were born anywhere in 
Georgia. 
 
3) International immigration to Atlanta in 2000 was more important than 
migration to Atlanta from other parts of Georgia, although this was not 
the case in 1990. 
 
4) International migration is becoming more important as Atlanta and 
Georgia have become internationally more prominent. 
 
5) The most important groups of migrants are Latin Americans, Asians 
and Europeans, in that order. 
 
6) Immigrants tend to differ from natives across a number of dimensions.  
Most importantly, immigrants from the developed world tend to be 
more educated, while immigrants from the developing world (especially 
Latin America and Africa) tend to be less educated. 
 
7) Labor market outcomes and incomes of recent immigrants depend on 
region of origin, with the more educated groups doing better than the 
less educated groups regardless of region of origin. 
 
8) Controlling for individual characteristics, recent immigrants do worse 
than natives across all labor market outcomes, although some of these 
differences appear to be eliminated through the process of assimilation. 
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9) Controlling for individual characteristics, migrants from areas where 
recent migrants do the worst also appear to assimilate the least. 
 
As Atlanta and Georgia look to the future, it is reasonable to assume that many of 
these trends will continue.  International migration to Atlanta will continue to be 
important.  While overall growth of the metropolitan region will likely slow 
somewhat, it will probably continue to be strong.  This analysis suggests that future 
migrants will likely represent a very mixed group consisting of well-educated 
immigrants from the developed world, and more vulnerable immigrants from the 
developing world.  Natives’ feelings about and response to these different groups of 
migrants will (and to some extent should) vary, as will the immigrants’ needs and 
effects on the local economy and public finances. 
These immigrants—as all past cohorts of immigrants—will assimilate and 
make substantial economic gains.  As the current stock of immigrants adjusts to the 
local culture and institutions, they will be replaced by new groups of immigrants who 
will likely be similar to the current stock: with varying degrees of education and 
economic success.  Meanwhile, the children of current immigrants will grow up even 
more assimilated, becoming truly bi-cultural.  The response of local populations to 
these changes will depend on political, cultural and economic views.  Those who are 
very dissatisfied with the current immigration context for one reason or another will 
advocate policy changes of various kinds.  However, the strong assimilation of past 
migrants, concurrent economic gains to the Atlanta and Georgia economies and 
relatively harmonious integration of ethnic communities into the metropolitan fabric 
suggest that the current arrangement is mutually beneficial, and that something has 
been done right.   
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